Nationalism theory has long acknowledged that in its relation to nationalism, 'religion' can refer both to a reflexive identity attached to a people group, and to an articulated and reasoned valuebased position. Even this bifurcation remains insufficiently precise. Religio-nationalisms reasoned ex patria -that is, beginning with the nationalist and proceeding from there to incorporate religion -tend towards values of exclusivity, division, and animosity to 'the other'. They have been charged with 'hijacking' religion as an identity whilst being at odds with members and leaders of that religion's practicing community. The exploratory case of the relationship between Russian Orthodoxy and Russian nationalism allows a comparison of ex patria religio-nationalism with its ex religio counterpart. It confirms to a large extent the hypothesis that reasoned religio-nationalism that begins with the religious and proceeds to the nationalist favors in contrast less antagonistic emphases such as inclusivity and benevolence.
Orthodoxy and Russian nationalism, a further delineation of reasoned religio-nationalism, distinguishing between perspectives from either end of the nationalist-religious spectrum. At the nationalist end of that spectrum, the ex patria rationale for reinforcing the relationship between religion and nation begins with nationalism and incorporates religion as a secondary aspect supporting that nationalism. Those who start from there define their relationship to religion from a position of nationalism. For others, at the religious end of the nationalist-religious spectrum, their starting point is the religious. The ex religio rationale expounds the association of religion with the nation from the position of a believer for whom faith comes first. Their relationship to the nation is worked out from a position of religious adherence. Figure One depicts the three sub-categories of religio-nationalism considered in this article.
[ Figure One about here]
The case-based hypothesis of this article is that considering the relationship between Russian Orthodoxy and the Russian nation from an Orthodox theological and philosophical perspective reveals a markedly different standpoint than is found when starting from a political, nationalist perspective that takes little or no account of Orthodox doctrine or practice. In considering the political ambivalence of religion, Daniel Philpott concludes bluntly that 'religion matters'; that is, the content of a religion, its doctrine and practice and theology of politics. He argues that although a religion's political theology does not of course explain the relationship between religion and nationalism in toto, specifically religious motivations differ from those based purely on identity (2007, 522) . Applying Philpott's insight to our exploratory case, a theo-political consideration of Russian Orthodoxy's relationship with nationalism provides an account of Russian nationalism that is different from that offered by those for whom Orthodoxy represents an identity rather than a faith expressed through religious observance. Specifically, such a theopolitical consideration seems less likely to develop an antagonistic and axiologically combative attitude to the non-Russian world. This article's normative position is that a theo-political approach to Russian nationalism, drawing on a range of Orthodox thinkers and doctrinal statements, has the potential to deepen understanding of the relationship of Orthodoxy as Christian belief to the concept of national identity, and in this way to reduce nationalism's more conflictual aspects and deepen the peaceable influence situated within Russian Orthodoxy itself.
I proceed by identifying the distinct contexts within which Orthodox and national identity are seen to overlap. The first of these consists of what I termed above reflexive religionationalism-in this case, the popular notion held by the majority of Russians that to be Russian is to be Orthodox. Such a notion does not demand detailed justification, but stems from selfidentification drawing primarily on history and culture, ethnicity and territoriality. Karpov, Lisovskaya, and Barry (2012) (2003, (28) (29) . Within reasoned religionationalism I distinguish two distinct strands-the nationalist ex patria strand, and the faith-based ex religio strand. The term 'strand' speaks here of the insistence that religion and nationalism represent distinct categories. Following Rogers Brubaker, 'nationalism and religion are often deeply intertwined … Yet intertwining is not identity: the very metaphor of intertwining implies a distinction between the intertwined strands' (Brubaker 2012, 16) . Both of these strands are concerned with elaborating and elucidating the relationship between religion and nation; they differ in that the nationalist ex patria strand starts with nationalism and from there works out its relationship with religion, whereas the ex religio strand starts with religion and from there works out its relationship with the nation. A similar distinction between 'religion as an identity phenomenon and religion as a values-based phenomenon' can be found in the work of Marzouki, McDonnell, and Roy (Patrikios 2017) . They concentrate their analysis on the nationalist strand across Europe, Israel, and the United States. I focus on the religious strand and the Russian context. This ex religio strand forms the principal part of this article and comprises those who would be identified as within the broad Russian nationalist camp, but whose perspective starts with Orthodoxy and works from there to nationalism. Within this strand I follow Smith in a focus on national leaders (2003, 29) ; those whose line of reasoning might be most readily identified as close to that of the contemporary Russian authorities-that is the Russian Orthodox Church itself and the three Orthodox philosophers singled out by the Kremlin under Vladimir Putin for particular study and acknowledgement, namely Vladimir Solovev (1853 -1900 , Nikolai Berdyaev (1874 -1948 ), and Ivan Il'in (1883 -1954 . In contrast to this ex religio perspective, the nationalist Andrew F. March's elaboration of comparative political theory provides important methodological context, particularly with regard to his emphasis on 'engaged comparative political theory ' (2009, 531) . March insists that comparative political theory must consist of more than merely writing about non-Western texts as a nod towards 'expanding the canon' and demonstrating that we are aware of other writings alien to 'our' approaches. Instead, the comparative approach ought to be of the first order, engaging with the content of ideas beyond Western writers for the sake of the ideas themselves and their contribution to our understanding of a debate, not as an intellectual curiosity at which to point and imply that somehow they do things differently there. The Russian example is chosen because Russian Orthodoxy providesas I argue later on the back of public opinion data and the writings of other western scholars-a clear example of the ex patria and ex religio strands of reasoned religio-nationalism in play. In line with March's approach, there is no 'othering' of Russia intended here. The assertion is that the tool developed in this article, of distinguishing between ex patria and ex religio reasoning in analysis of religio-nationalism, might prove useful for scholars of nationalism, period; not that it is only appropriate for a one-off conceptualisation of the Russian case alone.
Reflexive Religio-Nationalism-Ethnodoxy
To return to the definitional question, often what is meant by religion relates not to lived faith or accepted doctrine, but rather to an identity similar to ethnicity that is inherited from birth. For example, to be a Turk is to be a Muslim and to be Russian is to be Orthodox. Religion serves as a marker of the boundary between groups, regardless of the actual content of the religion.
Instead of orthodoxy, in the literal sense of 'correct doctrine', we are dealing here with what Karpov, Lisovskaya, and Barry term 'ethnodoxy', defined as a belief system that rigidly links a group's ethnic identity to its dominant religion and consequently tends to view other religions as potentially or actually harmful to the group's unity and well-being and, therefore, seeks protected and privileged status for the group's dominant faith (2012, 644) .
The concept of ethnodoxy draws on the notion of popular religiosity (Lippy 1994) , and distinguishes itself from orthodoxy by its loose relationship with formal doctrine. Ethnodox belief consists of a syncretic fusion of ideas that may draw on the doctrines associated with the dominant religion, or may be at odds with them. The unformalized nature of popular religion means that it is not uncommon for contradictory beliefs to be held, for example, superstitions with pagan roots incorporated within adherence to Christianity. Karpov, Lisovskaya, and Barry chose Russia as the test case for empirical endorsement of their concept of ethnodoxy. They justify the choice of Russia as the case study on the grounds of the close 'interplay between ethnonational and religious identities in that country ' (2012, 645) . In 2015, 57% of Russians said that being Orthodox is an important part of being truly Russian, with even a quarter of Muslims and the non-religious agreeing that this is the case (Pew Research Center 10 May 2017, 12).
When measuring religious belief, researchers seeking to ascertain the level of religiosity amongst a particular group-for example, the population of a given country-may simply ask people what faith, if any, they adhere to. A more tightly defined approach would be to ask how often people attend religious services, although studies in the United States have demonstrated that respondents tend to exaggerate the frequency of such attendance in social contexts where observance is deemed laudable (Norris and Inglehart 2004, 91) . In the case of Russia and its status as an Orthodox country, opinion poll data are in line with ethnodoxy. In 2016 80% of Russians self-identified as Orthodox believers, with the remainder being split between nonbelievers and believers in other religions. At the same time, only 6% of respondents said that they attended a religious service even once a month (Levada Center 2017, 167) . Not only is it probable that this latter figure is an exaggeration, but also that figure of 6% includes believers of other religions, amongst whom regular attendance at religious services is likely to be comparatively higher than amongst the Orthodox due to the commitment implicit in following a minority religion. Scholarly analysis from 2009, when opinion polls were reporting monthly church attendance at around 7%, estimated that the actual figure for the number of Russians 'attending church on a regular basis' was around 0.5% (Mitrokhin, Nuritova, and Kishkovsky 2009, 290) . What we see in Russia is a remarkable gap between the number of people who identify as Orthodox believers, and the number who regularly attend Orthodox services.
The predominantly ethnodox nature of belief across the Russian population stands as the first contextual factor to be identified in our consideration of the relationship between religion and nationalism from the theological and philosophical perspective. For most Russians, who do not engage to any great extent in either religion or politics, Orthodoxy and national patriotism are part of the same package. Believers' self-designation as Orthodox and patriotic represents a largely intuitive and self-evident position; it is part of being Russian. This is what I term reflexive religio-nationalism.
I turn now to the second context for consideration of the relationship between religion and nationalism, namely, reasoned religio-nationalism. This is when a considered case is made with the aim of expounding and reinforcing the relationship between religion and nation. The two strands of reasoned religio-nationalism that I identify here are the nationalist ex patria strand, and the faith-based ex religio strand. Both concern themselves with explaining the relationship between religion and nation; the ex patria strand starts with nationalism and from there works out its relationship with religion, the ex religio strand starts with religion and from there works out its relationship with the nation.
Reasoned Religio-Nationalism-the Nationalist ex patria Strand
The nationalist strand of reasoned religio-nationalism consists of what has been termed 'political Orthodoxy' (Verkhovskii 2003; Mitrofanova 2005) , and is made up of those people who seek to articulate and justify a connection between Russian Orthodoxy and Russian nationalism, but who do so from an explicit nationalist and political position, rather than from a theo-political perspective. In perhaps the most detailed account of political Orthodoxy published so far in the West, Russian scholar Anastasia Mitrofanova has provided a useful typology in an attempt to bring some order to the numerous nationalist political actors laying hold of the designation 'Russian Orthodox'. Amongst these groups and individuals, various sub-groups distinguish themselves by different geopolitical and ideological emphases. Whilst conservative nationalism sits a little incongruously in the ideological armory of a formerly leftist and internationalist Communist movement, it has a more comfortable fit amongst the skinhead groups, nationalist martial arts clubs, and similar street-level practitioners of contentious politics that form part of Russia's youth sub-culture. What Mitrofanova labels 'quasiOrthodoxy and neo-paganism ' (2005, 66) represents in some ways the logical conclusion of the idea that to be Russian is to be Orthodox, and the logical extension of a reasoned ex patria explanation of religio-nationalism that begins with the national and proceeds to the religious. issued a directive banning Ioann from publishing his views in the Moscow patriarchate's publications' (Corley 1995) .
For the purposes of this paper, the two points to emphasize in relation to the different streams of political Orthodoxy are first, that they are for the most part separate from and even antagonistic towards the Russian Orthodox Church as an institution; and second, that they are backed by well-developed ideological stances expounded in multiple texts by the movements' ideologues. On the first of these points, Irina Papkova notes that fundamentalist groups that have taken leading roles in political activism are 'decidedly lay in character', but nonetheless it is these fundamentalists who 'come closest to fitting the parameters usually associated by Western observers with the political platform of the church as a whole ' (2011, 65-66) . The second key point -that political Orthodoxy has a well-developed ideologically focused literature supporting it-serves to distinguish the political Orthodox from the large majority of what I called above, following Karpov, Lisovskaya, and Barry (2012) , ethnodox believers.
Reasoned Religio-Nationalism-the ex religio Strand. So far I have considered this relationship between Russian Orthodoxy and Russian nationalism from two perspectives. The first one-that of the majority of Russian people for whom the Orthodox faith serves as a marker of belonging to the Russian nation-operates at the intuitive level rather than being a carefully reasoned intellectual position. The second one-that of the political Orthodox-has a reasoned ex patria rationale stemming from and motivated by the political side of the Orthodoxy-nationalism balance rather than from the religious side. What is missing then is an ex religio explanation of the relationship between these two elements, an explanation that starts with the religious rather than with the political. An account of how Russian Orthodoxy relates to Russian nationalism that is situated within a theo-political context offers this previously neglected perspective. Hypothesizing that a primarily faith-based rationale might conceptually prefer unity over division, inclusivity over exclusivity, and benevolence over animosity, such a perspective allows for an Orthodox correlation with nationalism that is less antagonistic in its relationship to the Western world than the examples of political Orthodoxy The ideas themselves must be the object of our interest -even if it is only because we think they have social consequences. (2009, .
In the cases considered here, the fact of these three writers having been singled out as holiday reading for Russia's regional leaders speaks of their status. Analysis of their work need not, and does not in this article, restrict itself to the specific texts selected in this way. This is how it must be with entire nations converted to Christianity. (Solovev [1897] 2005, 246-47)
Solovev's argument then moved beyond the relatively abstract conceptualisation of nations as analogous to individuals in terms of their valued distinctives and their need for sanctification, as he provided specific examples of nations, and nationalism, gone astray. In particular Solovev used the history of the Spanish nation to argue against a narrow nationalism leading to violence. He contended that, more than any other nation, the Spanish had 'distorted the truth of Christianity in their practical conception of it and in their actions; more decisively than anyone they associated it with violence' to such an extent that 'the spiritual sword proved in the end to be as material and violent as the worldly, though more painful and less noble than the latter' (Solovev [1897 (Solovev [ ] 2005 . In The Justification of the Good, Solovev's ex religio development of religio-nationalism urged peace and Christ-like behaviour above violence and the use of the sword.
Nikolai Berdyaev was much influenced by Solovev and considered his 'great service [to be] his exposure of the wrongness of nationalism ' (1948, 125) . Berdyaev wrote in theo-political terms similar to Solovev's about the relationship between the Christian faith and nationalism. He emphasized the tendency of many nationalists to adopt religion simply as a signifier of ethnic identity, 'as an instrument of national power', whilst denying the essence of faith. To Berdyaev, nationalism was nothing more than idolatry where 'the nation replaces God'. He argued that, although different national groups have different expressions of faith-such as Russian
Orthodoxy, the Church of England, and Polish Catholicism-nationalism is 'foreign to the ideas of the Christian universalism of the Middle Ages: it is a product of modern history which has lost its sense of unity' (Berdyaev and Lowrie 1935, 87-88) .
Aware of the discussions in Orthodox thought, particularly during the late Imperial era, around the relationship of the Russian Orthodox Church to the Russian state and the interpretation of Il'in's perspective on nationalism stood against the doctrine of universality to a degree, as he argued against those Christians who saw themselves as citizens of heaven and did not embrace the divisions of nationalism ([1937] 2012, 229-30) . He linked such a denial of national identity to Bolshevik internationalism. Il'in portrayed nationalism as being more than reflexive, although he insisted that instinctual patriotism was better than no patriotism at all. He insisted too on the distinction between a positive love-based patriotism, and a patriotism that goes wrong and develops into aggression and militant chauvinism ([1937] 2012, 230-37) .
For Ivan Il'in, nationalism had a deep spiritual basis and must be based on love, rather than on ethnicity or blood. Each people group, in their homeland, represented for him 'the bearer and servant of the cause of God on earth, the carrier and form of the divine' ([1937] 2012, 269) . Whilst such a strong emphasis on the importance of national identity can most straightforwardly be interpreted-from a theological perspective-as being at odds with the notion of the universal church in which national distinctions mean nothing, it does also allow for a different interpretation that insists on recognizing national distinctives but retains such a perspective within the framework of the universal church and God's love for all peoples. This latter interpretation relies on Il'in's emphasis that the nationalism he professed was spiritual and love-based, and on his clear assertion that love for one's own homeland did not require that any people group be considered superior.
He considered the idea of superior nations to be 'bestial nationalism' since:
'No man and no people would be the only focus of the spirit, for the spirit lives in its own way in all people and all nations. True patriotism and nationalism is not blind love, but clearsighted, and its atmosphere is not only no stranger to goodness and fairness, and law, and most importantly, the Spirit of God, but it is one of the highest manifestations of spirituality on earth ' (Il'in [1937 ' (Il'in [ ] 2012 .
Il'in's commitment to the spiritual nature of nationalism remained with him to the end. 
Conclusions from a Theo-Political Reading of State-and Church-Endorsed Texts
The culmination of our analysis has been a theo-political reading of the Russian Orthodox Church's Social Concept and of writings from the three philosophers whose stance in relation to the 'Russian idea' has been-informally at least-endorsed by Russia's political leadership under Vladimir Putin. Assessing the nature of Russian Orthodoxy's relationship with Russian nationalism through considering the reasoned ex religio approach developed and promoted by Russia's religious and secular hierarchy reveals a more nuanced and less bellicose nationalism than is to be found within the reasoned ex patria discourse of the many Russian nationalist groups that assert their Orthodox identity. The religio-nationalism found in these officiallysanctioned authoritative sources critiques ideas of national superiority and emphasizes, or at least incorporates, concepts of common humanity, spirituality, and love. Il'in-the most nationalist and least well-known internationally of this trio of Russian philosophers-argued that the promotion of national superiority amounted to 'bestial nationalism' (Il'in [1937 (Il'in [ ] 2012 .
Beyond the specific context of the Russian case, the methodological requirement for definitional precision when considering the religion-nationalism nexus stands reinforced. Differing conclusions arise about the nature of religion's relationship with varieties of nationalism dependent on how researchers utilize the concept religion. Ethnodox conceptualizations of reflexive religio-nationalism, according to which an ethnic group and its majority confession are considered interchangeable, produce different interpretations of how that religion relates to nationalism than does analysis of reasoned argumentation elaborating a specific stance on the religion-nationalism relationship. Such a conclusion has long been understood (Smith 2003, 29) .
Further though, within reasoned development of the nationalism-religion relationship, I have identified two strands; the ex patria strand starting from nationalism and proceeding to religion, and the ex religio strand starting from religion and proceeding to nationalism. Some nationalists may adopt religion as an indicator of national identity, whilst their convictions, actions, and factions lie outside that religion's accepted doctrine, praxis, and community of practitioners. The function and content of their religion may then diverge from that of co-religionists whose religion embraces the established teaching, practice, and kinship groups of the religion as a whole, and whose stance with regard to nationalism may also differ. The hypothesis that a primarily faith-based rationale tends to orientate towards unity rather than division, inclusivity rather than exclusivity, and benevolence rather than animosity has been born out in our exploratory case of Russia. Such a finding coincides with the wider comparative conclusions of Marzouki, McDonnell, and Roy (2016) , who note the commonly held view of church leaders that religion has been hijacked and abused by nationalists in the specific examples that they study.
Their volume ranges widely across the northern hemisphere for its cases-the United States, Israel, and Europe East and West-and its analytical focus is on the reasoning that stems from nationalism more than from religion. The findings presented here provide a specific account concentrating in particular on the religious reasoning around nationalism in Russia. Whether the findings are sufficiently robust to be further generalizable waits on more extensive comparative research.
